Registry / Metaplex Token Metadata Program
Report card · Infrastructure
Metaplex Token Metadata Program
Metaplex Token Metadata: names, symbols, images and royalties for tokens and NFTs.
metaqbxxUerdq28cj1RbAWkYQm3ybzjb6a8bt518x1s
CertificationDevnet certification only: a jury of registered Verafy harnesses ruled on the report on Solana devnet. Its jurors voted by script, and only the Sniffed level is possible today. Not a full certification.
Devnet certification only: Sniffed
A jury of 4 registered Verafy harnesses from 4 model families ruled on this report on Solana devnet, and verafy_certification wrote the level for this exact build on November 9, 2026 at 9:26 PM UTC. This is not a full certification: the jurors voted by script in this run, it lives on devnet, and a Sniff run can earn Sniffed at most. The jury ruled on the scan from November 9, 2026 at 9:26 PM UTC; the report below may be a newer scan of the same build.
- Certification account
- 4jYnYAAUPT696wYTT7KsFzdWxqeYVmdnKzRWuMBBtkqt
- Jury ruling
- 4U3MdahRJgaX1VtoTzgAgW2jHDQVrgcpqhXs6t6oKVvf
- Certify transaction
- 37ZASB8L8cZS2F5Go4UWkxXBCGJCVu7D…
- Bytecode hash
- 99ee61a5159e15a359b01298b52c9f9f912eb19e47bdfe83987c16de52a4b1ff
- Report hash
- 120a37b8ab3fcedac977fe2e84272dc82aca9159a9af4a86f028029987c7e219
What ran
A Sniff run: 10 transactions in 36 seconds, 5 attack classes run, tested on mainnet replay (accounts cloned at slot 467477084). Nothing was sent to mainnet or devnet. How a run works
| Assessment | Result | What it means here | Based on |
|---|---|---|---|
| Missing signer check | held | Tried, and every attack in this class failed. | Sealevel Attacks (Coral, the Anchor team) |
| Missing owner check | not tried | Applies to this program, but did not run in this pass: none of the calls that completed gave this class something to target. | Solana Foundation course: Owner Checks |
| Account substitution | held | Tried, and every attack in this class failed. | Sealevel Attacks (Coral, the Anchor team) |
| PDA seed collision | not built yet | This class applies, but this engine version does not run it yet. | Sealevel Attacks (Coral, the Anchor team) |
| Arithmetic overflow | not tried | Applies to this program, but did not run in this pass: none of the calls that completed gave this class something to target. | Helius: A Hitchhiker's Guide to Solana Program Security |
| Close, then reuse | not built yet | This class applies, but this engine version does not run it yet. | Sealevel Attacks (Coral, the Anchor team) |
| Unchecked CPI target | not built yet | This class applies, but this engine version does not run it yet. | Solana Foundation course: Arbitrary CPI |
| Unchecked mint or authority | held | Tried, and every attack in this class failed. | Helius: A Hitchhiker's Guide to Solana Program Security |
| Lamport draining | held | Tried, and every attack in this class failed. | Helius: A Hitchhiker's Guide to Solana Program Security |
| Reinitialization | not tried | Applies to this program, but did not run in this pass: none of the calls that completed gave this class something to target. | Solana Foundation course: Reinitialization Attacks |
| Price manipulation | not built yet | This class applies, but this engine version does not run it yet. | Helius: A Hitchhiker's Guide to Solana Program Security |
| Compute exhaustion | held | Tried, and every attack in this class failed. | Solana docs: fees and compute budget |
Depth: 48 of 100
| Part | Points | Measured as |
|---|---|---|
| Branch coverage | 0 / 40 | Share of the program's branches executed. Not measured yet. |
| Instructions driven | 20 / 20 | Share of instructions driven to both success and failure. |
| Attack classes tried | 8 / 20 | Share of the classes that apply to this program that actually ran. |
| Real state | 10 / 10 | 10 for cloned mainnet accounts, 5 for accounts built from the IDL, 0 for none. |
| Effort | 10 / 10 | Share of the planned run completed within the time limit. |
Instructions
Fuzzy first calls each instruction the way an honest user would. Only instructions that complete an honest call can be attacked.
Findings and leads
No proven findings. No leads.
Source and dependencies
Source: OtterSec verification service, last verified Nov 17, 2025.
Dependency advisories did not run: The verification record names a repository but no commit, so Fuzzy cannot pin the exact dependencies.
Gaps in this run
- The program publishes no Anchor IDL on chain, so Fuzzy could not read its instruction names, accounts or arguments.
- Built attack classes that apply but did not run: Missing owner check, Arithmetic overflow, Reinitialization.
- Attack classes that apply but are not built yet: PDA seed collision, Close, then reuse, Unchecked CPI target, Price manipulation.
- Branch coverage is not measured in this engine version (0 of 40 Depth points).
Planned add-ons not run on this program yet: rebuild from source, static lints, deep fuzz, property fuzzing, ai design review, kitchen sink.
The build
- Bytecode SHA-256
- 31f0a627dba051a938de650464e55cc5397a4be0fd496929c1f9cf02fe5e9011
- Size
- 775 KB
- Upgradeable
- No
- Anchor IDL
- Not published on chain
- Engine
- fuzzy-engine/0.2.0 · Sniff
For agents
GET https://fuzzy.verafy.ai/api/registry?program=metaqbxxUerdq28cj1RbAWkYQm3ybzjb6a8bt518x1s GET https://fuzzy.verafy.ai/api/certification?program=metaqbxxUerdq28cj1RbAWkYQm3ybzjb6a8bt518x1s
Or use the Fuzzy MCP server. Docs